We conducted a retrospective evaluation of alternative management strategies for 12 stocks in the New England groundfish complex that have had recent history of target 13 catches being set above the level that defines overfishing. In many cases the original 14 target catches were unsustainable, and would have resulted in stock collapses if the target 15 catch had been removed. We evaluated (1) alternative harvest control rules, (2) whether 16 17 or not to do projections, (3) if the inputs to the projections (starting abundance and 17 future recruitments) should be modified, and (4) if the target catches should be smoothed 18
The aim of modern single species fisheries management is to maintain the 34 population size of the target stock close to the level that produces maximum sustainable 35 yield (MSY; Hilborn 2010) . Managers attempt to attain this target population biomass 36 (B MSY ) by setting catch limits that will achieve exploitation rates close to the level that 37 achieves MSY, or F MSY . In practice, however, achieving a target harvest rate can be 38 challenging due to uncertainty in our understanding of the biology and of the population 39 size of the target species (scientific uncertainty), and also uncertainty in how the fishery 40 responds to regulations (management uncertainty). The relative importance and sources 41 of these uncertainties may vary by system or by species within a system, and identifying 42 appropriate management strategies for dealing with this ever present uncertainty is 43 crucial for the sustainable management of global fisheries. estimates across repeated assessments for stocks off the western U.S. and southeastern 61
Australia, respectively, with the aim of identifying appropriate buffer sizes for setting 62 target catches to account for scientific uncertainty. Wiedenmann and Jensen (2018) 63 reviewed the assessment and management performance for stocks in the New England 64 groundfish complex since 2004, and found that harvest rates for many stocks continued to 65 exceed F MSY , despite target catches for these stocks set to achieve harvest rates generally 66 at or below 75% of F MSY (the full control rule is to use 75% of F MSY, or for stocks that are 67 overfished use the lesser of 75% of F MSY or the F that allows for rebuilding in a specified 68 timeframe; Federal Register 2009). Actual catches were below the target catches in most 69 cases (29% below on average, across stocks and years), and the primary causes of high 70
Fs were overly optimistic projections used to set the catch targets, resulting from Our focus is determining whether alternative methods for setting catch targets 119 could have prevented or reduced overfishing for groundfish stocks, but before describing 120 our approach we must first define what we mean by overfishing. In the U.S., managers 121 annually specify the catch that is estimated to achieve F MSY , also called the overfishing 122 limit, or OFL (herein called the management OFL). If the catch exceeds the management 123 OFL in a given year, overfishing technically occurs. However, a later assessment could 124
show that the management OFL was underestimated, such that the estimated F in that 125 year may be below F MSY . Alternatively, the estimated F may be above F MSY even if the 126 catch did not exceed the management OFL that was later determined to be overestimated. 127
Our focus here is on the historical definition of overfishing, and our definition of the OFL 128 is the estimated catch that would have achieved F MSY in hindsight based on the current 129 understanding of past stock dynamics from the most recent stock assessment (herein 130 called the hindsight OFL; see section Calculating performance of the alternative methods 131 below for more details). 132
The work detailed herein was applied to nine of the twenty stocks in the New 133
England groundfish complex (Table 1) . We focused on those stocks that had age-based 134 target catches on projected changes in abundance, and 5) methods for smoothing the 164 target catches. Multiple approaches were explored within most categories (Table 2) , and 165 we applied the methods in a factorial manner (for a total of 378 combinations) to 166 determine the effect that different combinations of approaches would have on setting the 167 target catches. The methods within these five categories can be broadly classified as 168 either adjustments to the population inputs into the projection model (1 and 2), and 169 alternative ways of determining the target catch given the inputs (3,4, and 5). 170
Modifying starting abundance-at-age 171
We evaluated three methods (numbered 1-3) for setting the initial abundance-at-172 age (N init (a)) in the projection model (Table 3) . For run 1, we used the original 173 (unmodified) distribution of abundance-at-age (N orig (a)) for each projection. For runs 2 174 and 3, we used an adjustment factor, f, and calculated a modified abundance-at-age with. 175
For run 2, f was based on a measure of the average retrospective error in the terminal 179 assessment estimates. The specific measure used was called Mohn's ρ (Mohn 1999), 180
and we obtained estimates of ρ for each stock from NEFSC (2002, 2005, 2008) . 181
Estimates of ρ were generally positive (indicating a tendency for overestimation of 182 terminal biomass), but there were also some negative estimates. Because our focus was 183 on identifying options that would have produced more conservative target catches, we 184 only made abundance adjustments when ρ was positive (i.e., f = max(0, ρ)). For run 3, f 185 was based on the relative error in terminal biomass from the previous assessment (REB). assessment, the estimate of ρ is an average of the REB in the last 5-7 years, but here our 194 REB estimate compares across assessments, and thus takes into account the impact that 195 changes to the assessment model or data had on the terminal estimates. 196
Modifying future recruitments 197
Forecasted recruitments in the original projections were done in one of two ways; 198 they were either based on random draws around a Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment fit, or 199 they were drawn from an empirical distribution based on some portion of the estimated 200 time series of recruitment for a stock. For run 1 (Table 2) had declined in recent years. We assumed a minimum initial interval of 5 years, and 213 omitted the terminal year estimate of recruitment due to the high uncertainty in the 214 estimate. In some cases, no regime shift was detected for the entire time series, while in 215 other cases, both increases and decreases were predicted in a single time series (Figure 1) . 216
In cases where the mean recruitment from the terminal regime was lower than the mean 217 from the previous regime, we used the empirical recruitment estimates from the terminal 218 regime period only in the projection model. If no decline or an increase in recent 219 recruitment was detected, no modification was made to the forecasted recruitment 220 method. When a lower recruitment regime was detected, we did not adjust the reference 221 points because this would have altered the performance of the threshold control rules that 222 reduce the harvest rate as the biomass falls below the spawning biomass reference point 223 S MSY (see below), and also impacted the target F based on rebuilding projections for some 224
stocks. 225

Alternative Harvest Control Rules 226
The existing control rule for New England groundfish stocks has been to use the 227 lesser value of 75% of F MSY or F rebuild (if the population is in need of rebuilding). We 228 evaluated a total of 7 control rules (runs 1-7), with the historical target F used in run 1. 229
For runs 2 and 3 the target F was set to 65% and 75% of the estimated F MSY in each 230 projection, regardless of whether or not it was lower than the estimated 
For run 3), if C prev is the target catch in the final year of the previous management period, 285 then the target catch in year t is a weighted average of C prev and C * target (t), 286
where w represents a weighting factor. Values of w between 0 and 1 are possible, but we 290 used an even weight (w = 0.5) for run 3. Note that we used the smoothed catches, 291 regardless of whether or not they were above the estimated OFL at the time (covered in 292 more detail in the Discussion). 293
Calculating performance of the alternative methods 294
The alternative methods produced different target catches for each management 295 period for each stock, and the next step was to try to understand what impact such 296 changes in target catches would have had on the stock. Alternative target catches lower 297 or higher than the original target catches could have resulted in growth or decline in the 298 stock, respectively. In MSE simulations, the impacts of such catches would change the 299 D r a f t abundance of the stock over some period, which would potentially be identified in later 300 assessments, and catches would be adjusted accordingly based on the management 301 strategy being tested in the closed-loop of the simulation. Here, we have one realization 302 for each stock, with abundance in a given year driven by past catches and stock 303
productivity. 304
For each stock, we obtained estimated abundance-, weight-, selectivity-, and 305 maturity-at-age, and management reference points from the most recent age-based stock 306 assessment that has passed review for each stock. For six of the stocks, the most recent 307 assessment was in 2017 (NEFSC 2017b), but for GB yellowtail, GB cod, and witch 308 flounder, recent age-based assessments did not pass review. For these stocks we used the 309 most recent assessment that passed review (NEFSC 2012 for GB cod, Legault Given the limitations of both of these approaches, we opted for a third approach. 331
We applied the target catches from each management period to each stock, and only 332 evaluated the impact such catches would have had on the stock over that management 333 period. The impact of each alternative method for setting catch targets was therefore 334 independent across assessment periods. Doing so allowed for the population size (and 335 the hindsight OFL) to change over time in response to new target catches, but such 336 changes are quantified separately for each management period for each stock. For 337 management periods 1, 2, and 3, we started off the population at the estimated abundance 338 from the most recent assessment in the first year of the period (2004, 2006, or 2010) . 339
Recruitment in subsequent years was based on the annual estimates from the most recent 340 assessment. We explored allowing for dynamics changes in recruitment based on 341 changes in spawning biomass (determined from stock-recruit fits to the model estimates), 342 but found little difference in the results. For each stock, this approach produced dynamic 343 estimates of the hindsight OFL for each management period independently, and we 344 compared target catches under each alternative method to the resulting dynamic hindsight 345 D r a f t OFL to determine which methods, if any, would have consistently reduced the magnitude 346 of overfishing for groundfish. We also calculated the proportion of times during each 347 management period in which a given method would have caused overfishing (calculated 348 across years and stocks for the management period), and would have caused a collapse of 349 the stock. We defined a collapse as any year in which the target catch was ≥ 95% of the 350 exploitable biomass in that year. In such cases, the maximum instantaneous fishing 351 mortality rate resulting from the catch was capped at 3.0, preventing the stock biomass 352 from dropping below 0. IQR, of 2 -31%), while the relative error adjustment resulted in a larger median 371 reduction (23%), but a broader range too (IQR between a 2% increase to 45% decrease). 372
For the alternative control rules, the only difference between the P* control rules resulted 373 from the assumed CV (0.5 or 1.0), and not the ways in which the buffer size differed atD r a f t 35%), followed by the ramped P* option with a CV of 0.5 (20% reduction; IQR 3-30%). 378
The largest single reduction occurred when no projections were used (fixing the target 379 catch over the assessment interval based on the terminal biomass estimate) resulting in a 380 37% decrease (IQR 14-50%) in target catches, on average across stocks. Accounting for 381 declines in recruitment only had a substantial reduction in target catches for three stocks 382 (SNE/MA winter flounder, SNE/MA yellowtail flounder, and CC/GOM yellowtail 383 flounder), reducing the target catch by 29%, on average for these stocks (IQR 5-45%). 384
Attempts to smooth the target catch tended to result in target catches that were 385 comparable, or higher than the original target catch that used the unsmoothed values, so 386 we therefore excluded these catch smoothing methods from subsequent analyses (Figure  387 
4). 388
The results in Figure 4 explore the effect that a single factor had on the target 389 catches, but we also evaluated the impact of different methods in combination with one 390
another. Although many methods resulted in declines in the target catches relative to the 391 actual target catch, such declines may still have been insufficient to prevent overfishing. 392
We therefore calculated the impact that combined methods had on limiting overfishing. 393
For each stock we calculated the ratio of mean target catch to the hindsight OFL over 394 each management period, with the hindsight OFL here dynamic based on the impact that 395 the target catches would have had on stock abundance over the management period 396 (Table 3) . For each management period we also calculated the proportion of times that 397 the target catch would have resulted in overfishing, or resulted in a collapse of the stock 398 ( Figure 5) . In some cases, the target catch was so high that it was ≥ 95% of the 
calculation due to the very large ratio). Using retrospective adjustments of abundance (a 410
Mohn's ρ adjustment) resulted in a 28, 27, and 26% average decrease across management 411 periods in the catch / hindsight OFL, while using the relative error adjustment resulted in 412 a 27% decrease in period 2, and a 50% reduction in period 3 (Table 3 ). The ramped P* 413 control rule (option 7 in Table 2 ) alone would have reduced the mean catch / hindsight 414 OFL by in management periods 1 and 2 by 42 and 28%, respectively, but would have 415 resulted in an increase in the target catch / hindsight OFL of 87% for management period 416 D r a f t (Table 3) . 424
Although these methods alone tended to reduce the magnitude of overfishing, 425 they did not end overfishing in most cases (Table 3) period. Using the 75% or 65% F MSY control rule resulted in the overfishing more often 436 than not, even when used with no projections and an abundance modification (63% and 437 58%, respectively), although these methods did reduce the frequency of stock collapses 438 ( Figure 5) . 439 These combined alternative methods were able to reduce the frequency and 440 magnitude of overfishing across most stocks, but limiting overfishing is not the only 441 objective of fisheries management, otherwise the solution would be to just shut the 442 fishery down. In Figure 6 we show the aggregate yield across management periods for a 443 subset of methods (yield is shown with and without haddock due to the scale of haddock 444 catches relative to all other groundfish; panels a and b, respectively). Although 445 D r a f t reductions in catches were very large relative to the actual target catch (being 51-82% 446 lower depending on the method and management period, excluding GB haddock), the 447 actual catches that occurred for these stocks were also lower than the target (34-40% 448 lower, excluding haddock). Therefore, some of the combined methods did not result in 449 as drastic reductions relative to the actual catch that occurred. For example, fishing at 450 75% of the estimated F MSY , without projections and with a ρ modification resulted in 451 target catches 31%, 29%, and 19% lower than the aggregate catch (without haddock) in 452 management periods 1, 2, and 3 respectively. In contrast, the ramped P* control rule 453 (option 6 in Table 2 ) without projections resulted in reductions of 35%, 44%, and 36% 454 for the same management periods, and reductions of 60%, 60%, 51% when combined 455 with the ρ adjustment. These reductions are relative to the actual catches, which still 456 resulted in overfishing for many stocks. When compared to the OFL, some of the 457 combinations of methods resulted in considerable foregone yield to the fishery. For 458 example, the more conservative combination of methods explored (the ramped P* control 459 rule with a CV of 1.0, no projections, and a ρ-adjustment to abundance), target catches 460 were below 30% of the hindsight OFL in most management periods (and below 50% in 461 all periods) for GB cod, SNE/MA winter flounder, SNE/MA yellowtail, and CC/GOM 462 yellowtail flounder (Table 3 ). This version of the ramped P* control rule allowed for 463 fishing even at very low levels of biomass, but when the version that shut down the 464 fishery when biomass falls below 10% of S MSY was used (in conjunction with abundance 465 modifications and no projections) target catches would have been set to 0 for GB cod and 466 SNE/MA yellowtail in management period 1, and for SNE/MA winter flounder in 467 periods 2 and 3 (Table 3 ).
D r a f t
We conducted a retrospective evaluation of alternative management strategies for 470 stocks in the New England groundfish complex that have had recent history of target 471 catches resulting in overfishing. In many cases the original target catches were 472 unsustainable, and would have resulted in stock collapses had the target catch been 473 achieved. We evaluated (1) alternative harvest control rules, (2) whether or not to do 474 projections, (3) whether the inputs to the projections (starting abundance and future 475 recruitments) should be modified, and if the target catches should be smoothed to prevent 476 large changes from year to year. The greatest reductions in target catches resulted when 477 no projections were done and the target catch was fixed over the management period. 478
Large reductions in target catches also occurred when a downward adjustment was made 479
to the starting abundance in the projections. Neither approach alone was sufficient to 480 prevent overfishing for most stocks, but when used in conjunction with one another or 481 with an alternative control rule that reduced the target harvest rate as biomass fell below 482 the target, the magnitude and frequency of overfishing was greatly reduced for most 483 stocks. Attempts to adjust recruitment based on perceived changes over time were also 484 effective for a few stocks, while attempts to smooth changes in the target catches were 485 counterproductive and often resulted in increases in the target catches. and this snowballing effect can be particularly problematic for stocks that are projected to 494 increase in size under the target F. For groundfish, the stocks we evaluated were all 495 below the spawning biomass target (S MSY ), at least initially, and projections all used target 496 harvest rates that resulted in predicted increases in biomass and catch over time in the 497 model. Updated assessments, however, indicated that terminal biomass was consistently 498 overestimated in earlier assessments for these stocks (Wiedenmann and Jensen 2018) . 499
These projections were starting with inflated estimates of abundance and were expecting 500 this abundance to increase over time (Brooks and Legault 2016) . Target catches from the 501 projections therefore increased over time, often to levels that would have caused the stock 502 to collapse had the target catch been realized. The exception to this pattern was GB 503 haddock, which after a few very large recruitments during our study period was estimated 504 to be above the biomass target in 2007 (NEFSC 2008). For this stock, projections 505 indicated a decline in catch over time as the biomass approached the target, such that not 506 doing projections resulted in higher target catches than if they had been done. Our 507 finding is therefore that projections should not be the basis for setting catch targets for 508 groundfish that are depleted and expected to increase. That is, we should not base future 509 catch targets on predicted increases in abundance that may or may not be realized. This 510 policy was recently adopted by the Scientific and Statistical Committee of the NEFMC 511 for the setting of the ABC for groundfish. Although our finding is specific to the New 512
England groundfish stocks we evaluated, exploration into the use and efficacy of 513 projections in other regions is warranted.D r a f t assessment estimates in New England groundfish was to do a retrospective (ρ) 516 adjustment to the terminal biomass in the assessment for assessments with a strong 517 retrospective pattern (e.g., NEFSC 2008 NEFSC , 2012 NEFSC , 2015 NEFSC , 2017b . Operationally, a strong 518 pattern has been defined as when the adjusted terminal biomass falls outside of the 519 confidence bounds of the terminal biomass estimate (Brooks and Legault 2016) . We 520 evaluated doing adjustments regardless of the magnitude of the adjusted biomass, in part 521 because estimates of assessment uncertainty were not always available in the 522 assessments, but also because past work showed that ρ is a poor predictor of changes in 523 biomass estimates in future assessments (Brooks and Legault 2016; Wiedenmann and 524 Jensen 2018). In some cases terminal biomass estimates from assessments with small 525 positive retrospective patterns were revised substantially downward in later assessments. 526
Although our work here, and earlier work of Brooks and Legault (2016) showed that such 527 adjustments alone were insufficient to end overfishing in most cases, their continued use 528 is warranted as they did reduce the magnitude of overfishing when applied. 529
Research has shown that recruitment and overall stock productivity is largely 530 driven by environmental forcing (Gilbert 1997 however, we found that such attempts were only effective for a few stocks. This finding 534 was driven by the fact that declines in recruitment were often not detected by the regime 535 shift algorithm we used, despite overall declines in recruitment for many stocks ( where no decline was detected. Many of the assessments overestimated total abundance 540 and recruitment in the final years of the model, such that no decline in recruitment was 541 apparent in the time series used in the regime detection algorithm. Thus, trying to 542 account for changes in recruitment is particularly challenging for stocks with strong 543 retrospective patterns. Also, even if changes in recruitment had been accurately captured 544 in the projections, the impact on the target catches was smaller than if the starting 545 abundance was correct (Brooks and Legault 2016) . This reduced effect is due to the fact 546 that it takes three or more years for most of the recruits to enter the fishery, such that the 547 impact of accurate recruitment forecasts only becomes apparent towards the end of longer 548 projection intervals (Brooks and Legault 2016) . 549
Many MSE-based studies have evaluated the performance of different harvest 550 control rules, and in general found that control rules that are more conservative as 551 biomass declines perform well overall, and are often better-suited for limiting overfishing 552 and reducing the risk of becoming overfished, and also allowing for more rapid recovery 553 of depleted stocks than options that apply a fixed harvest rate (Punt 2003 are in agreement with these simulation-based studies, as using the ramped P* control rule 556 had a lower risk of overfishing or of stock collapse compared to using 75% or even 65% 557 of F MSY . However, use of the ramped control rule in conjunction with a biomass 558 adjustment often resulted in target catches being very conservative for some groundfish 559 stocks (catch < 20% of the hindsight OFL). In particular, using a ramped control rule that 560 D r a f t closes the fishery at low biomass would have set target catches to 0 in some years in 561 instances in our analysis. While very low catches or even closure of a fishery may be 562 warranted in certain cases, they can present challenges in a mixed stock fishery such as 563 groundfish where species are caught together. A 'choke' stock with tight catch 564 restrictions could limit the ability to catch the total allocation for stocks in good 565 condition. This is already occurring for some groundfish stocks (e.g., catches of GB 566 haddock are limited in part by restrictive catch limits for GB yellowtail and GB cod). 567
Thus, although our work showed that ramped control rules preformed better than the 568 current control rule at limiting overfishing, adoption of such a control rule would require 569 careful evaluation of the impacts on the fishery as a whole. MSE studies tend to focus on 570 control rule performance using single species models, but development of models that 571 capture dynamics of mixed stock fisheries such as New England groundfish is needed. 572
Our finding that approaches to smooth the target catch performed poorly is not 573 surprising given the history of overfishing for the groundfish stocks in our analysis. That 574 is, when prior catches resulted in overfishing for a stock, using a weighted average of 575 past and current catch targets will likely result in continued overfishing. In our analysis 576 we used the smoothed target catch, regardless of whether or not it was above the 577 estimated OFL at the time, which is currently not allowed under U.S. law (gradual 578 reductions in the ABC, called phasing-in, are allowed if it is below the estimated OFL; 579 Federal Register 2015). During the period of our analysis, gradual changes in the target 580 fishing mortality rate were used in rebuilding plans for some New England groundfish 581 stocks that allowed for F > F MSY in early years of the rebuilding period (see Wiedenmann  582 and Jensen 2018 for more details), so using smoothed target catches above the OFL 583 D r a f t would not necessarily have been rejected outright. In our work, the smoothed target 584 catches were often below the original target catch (Figure 4e ), but still resulted in 585 overfishing in many cases due to overestimated abundance in assessment. Thus, care is 586 needed when using a phased-in or smoothing approach, particularly for stocks with 587 strong retrospective patterns where abundance (and the OFL) may be overestimated. 588
A caveat of our work is that we are using the updated model estimates to evaluate 589 the performance of historical catch targets. In MSE simulations, the true abundance of 590 the stock is known in the operating model so the impact that different management 591 strategies have on a stock is known. Here, we relied on the most recent assessment 592 estimates as our measure of "truth," but it is likely that these estimates may change in 593 future assessments. Many of the assessments for New England groundfish have strong 594 retrospective patterns (some of which are worsening), with estimates in final years of an 595 assessment revised downward in later assessments (NEFSC 2017b). Our analysis used 596 estimated abundance from the most recent assessment through 2012, and some of these 597 estimates may change in later assessments, either due to a retrospective pattern or due to 598 large-scale changes in the assessment model. Recent work has shown estimated 599 abundance in recent years from age-based assessments may be biased low based on 600 comparisons with swept-area biomass estimates calculated from the Northeast Fisheries 601
Science Center (NEFSC) spring and fall bottom trawl surveys. Swept area biomass 602 estimates for flatfish stocks in the groundfish complex have either been comparable or 603 higher than age-based estimates in recent years, although the magnitude of the difference 604 varies by stock (NEFSC 2017b). Large changes in historical biomass estimates (up or 605 down) could affect our results, and we recommend that an evaluation of this sort be 606 D r a f t conducted regularly as new information arises so that managers and scientific advisors 607 can weigh such information in the process of setting future catch limits. 608
For six of the nine stocks in our analysis, the most recent age-based assessment 609 (NEFSC 2017b) is considered the best available science for each stock, despite concerns 610 raised about the swept-area estimates. For three of the stocks (GB yellowtail flounder, 611 witch flounder, and GB cod), the recent age-based assessments have been rejected as the 612 basis for management advice by peer review panels. For GB cod and yellowtail flounder, 613 the age-based assessments were rejected because of very strong retrospective patterns. 614
For witch flounder, a strong retrospective pattern combined with the higher swept area 615 estimates led to rejection of the most recent age-based assessment (NEFSC 2017a). For 616 these stocks we relied on the most current assessment that passed review as our source of 617 updated estimates (NEFSC 2012, 2015; Legault et al. 2013 ). The performance of 618 different methods for setting catch targets was similar for these stocks as it was for the 619 other stocks, such that if we removed these three stocks from our analysis, the qualitative 620 conclusions about the effectiveness of the different options would remain the same. 621
Removing these stocks would lower our estimated frequencies of overfishing and stock 622 collapse, however, as both GB yellowtail flounder and witch flounder experienced 623 continued overfishing even for some of the more effective combination of methods 624 (Table 3 ). The use of older assessment estimates for these stocks would only be 625 problematic for our analyses if the remedies to the current problems drastically changed 626 historical estimates. 627
Our identification of effective methods for setting catch targets for New England 628 groundfish was based on a retrospective evaluation of historical catch targets. This 629 D r a f t approach is not a MSE, but we argue for using such an approach as part of the overall 630 process of development, testing and evaluation of management strategies (of which MSE 631 is an integral component), to make sure that those methods identified in the MSE, or 632 those that have been in place for some time, would have met the management objectives 633 for most stocks, and to identify possible alternatives when objectives would not have 634 been met (Figure 7) . The frequency, magnitude and direction of the uncertainty in catch 635 targets may change with future assessments, such that the successful approaches we 636 identified in this work may no longer be effective for setting future catch targets. We 637 therefore recommend that this sort of retrospective analysis be done on a regular basis to 638 original method used to set the catch targets. Methods from different categories were 800 explored in a factorial manner (for a total of 378 combinations of approaches) to 801 determine the impact that combined approaches would have. For example, a 802 retrospective adjustment of estimated abundance was explored using the different control 803 rules, with or without projections, and so on. separated by colors, and the number refers to the specific approach detailed in Table 2 . 841
For the recruitment modification plot, results are separated out by specific stocks. (a), and where the target catch would have been greater than 95% of the exploitable 846 biomass (b) for alternative catch setting methods. We calculated the proportion 847 individually for each management period, but the values were similar across periods for 848 each method, so we averaged them together for each method. Orig. target refers to the 849 original target catch set for management, NP refers to no projections, AM refers to 850 modifying abundance, P* refers to the ramped control rule (option 7) and 75% and 65% 851 refer to control rule options 2 and 3 (Table 2 ). When multiple approaches are listed it 852 means they were used in combination (e.g., NP, P* means no projections were done and 853 the P* control rule was used). The horizontal dashed line at 0.5 in a) delineates where 854 overfishing is more likely to occur than not. Catch is relative to the original target catch set for management. Obs_C refers to the 859 observed catch, NP refers to no projections, AM refers to modifying abundance, P* refers 860 to the ramped control rule (option 7) and 75% and 65% refer to control rule options 2 and 861 3 (Table 2 ). When multiple approaches are listed it means they were used in combination 862 (e.g., NP, P* means no projections were done and the P* control rule was used). fits in the broader context of using MSEs to identify robust management strategies. There )''" are many points throughout the process where a retrospective evaluation could be done, )'(" either in the identification of which strategies should be included in the MSE, or once the )')" MSE is completed, robust options could be evaluated for historical performance on )'*" stocks within a region. In cases where a management strategy has been implemented for )(+" many years, a retrospective evaluation could be conducted to see if objectives are being )(!" met. If not, then revisiting the MSE is warranted, either to modify the operating model or )(#" to include alternative management options. )($" )(%" )(&"
